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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- SELF-INCRIMINATION:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS
REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE IDENTIFICATION
DURING A LAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004)
I. FACTS
While investigating a report of an assault, a deputy sheriff for Hum-
boldt County, Nevada, encountered a man and woman stopped along the
road.1 The report indicated that a man was assaulting a woman in a truck
on that road.2 The deputy observed skid marks behind the truck, causing
him to conclude that the vehicle had come to an abrupt stop. 3 The unknown
man was standing next to the truck and appeared intoxicated. 4 Acting under
authority given by Nevada statute, often referred to as a "stop and identify"
statute, the deputy requested the man's identification. 5 The man refused to
identify himself and became agitated. 6 The deputy's request was refused
eleven times before the deputy warned the unknown man that he would be
arrested if he continued to refuse to identify himself.7 When the unknown
man still refused to comply, the deputy placed him under arrest.8
After being arrested, the authorities identified the unknown man as
Larry Dudley Hiibel.9 Mr. Hiibel was charged with preventing the deputy
from carrying out his duties under Nevada's "stop and identify" statute.' 0
The statute provides that "[a]ny peace officer may detain any person whom
the officer encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that
the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime.""
The detention must be only for the purpose of identifying the individual and
1. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. County 59 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Nev. 2002).
2. Id. at 1203.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2003)).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2003).
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there is no requirement that any other questions be answered by the person
being temporarily detained.12
Mr. Hiibel was convicted for failing to comply with Nevada Revised
Statute (NRS) Section 171.123.13 In a four-to-three opinion, the Nevada
Supreme Court rejected Hiibel's Fourth Amendment claim on the basis that
the Nevada statute sufficiently balanced the privacy rights of individuals
against the safety needs of law enforcement.14 The Nevada court stated that
the Fourth Amendment only protected against unreasonable searches and
seizures.15 The court held that it was reasonable to suspect Mr. Hiibel of
criminal conduct given the report of domestic violence in the vicinity. 16 As
a result, the court believed the interest of law enforcement in investigating
criminal conduct outweighed the Fourth Amendment concerns. 17 However,
the court did not address the question of whether there was a Fifth Amend-
ment violation.18 The defendant appealed the decision on Fourth and Fifth
Amendment grounds.19
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 20 The first issue
before the Court was whether requiring an individual to identify themselves
during an investigatory stop was an unreasonable search and seizure. 21 The
Court held that Nevada's "stop and identify" statute met the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment because the request for identification was directly
related to the reason for the stop. 22 The second issue before the Court was
whether compelled self-identification during the course of a valid investiga-
tory stop amounted to self-incrimination. 23 The Court held that Nevada's
"stop and identify" statute did not violate Hiibel's Fifth Amendment rights
because there was no reasonable basis for him to fear that criminal
prosecution would be a result of him providing his identification. 24
12. Id.
13. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203.
14. Id. at 1203-07.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. ld.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. v (stating "[n]o person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself').
19. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2456 (2004).
20. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 540 U.S. 965 (2003).
21. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2457.
22. Id. at 2458.
23. Id. at 2460.
24. Id. at 2461.
[VOL. 81:351
2005] CASE COMMENT
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures.25 The Supreme Court has held that police stops made because of a
reasonable belief of criminal activity are not in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.2 6 The Supreme Court determines the reasonableness of the
intrusion by balancing the interests of the government against the Fourth
Amendment rights of the individual.2 7 Statements made to law enforcement
officers are another aspect of investigatory stops.2 8 To be in compliance
with the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against self-incrimination,
testimonial statements made during a detention must not be compelled or
incriminating. 29
Nevada's "stop and identify" law calls for an individual stopped under
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to identify themselves upon the
request of a police officer.3 0 Further, Nevada's statute allows the officer to
detain the individual until they comply with the request, but no longer than
sixty minutes.3 1 However, the "stop and identify" statutes of other states
vary in their identification requirements, ranging from demanding to see a
driver's license3 2 to requiring a recitation of the individual's name and
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states, "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons.., against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated... but
upon probable cause." Id.
26. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
27. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
28. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-38 (2000).
29. Id.
30. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. County, 59 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Nev. 2002) (citing NEV.
REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2003)). The statute reads:
1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing
or is about to commit a crime ...
3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his
identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any
person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any
other inquiry of any peace officer.
4. A person must not be detained longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the
purposes of this section, and in no event longer than 60 minutes. The detention must
not extend beyond the place or the immediate vicinity of the place where the detention
was first effected, unless the person is arrested.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(l)(3)(4) (2003).
31. Id.
32. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401 (2003). The statute provides, "A peace officer who has
lawfully stopped a person or vehicle under this section may: (a) request the person's name and
present address and an explanation of the person's actions and, if the person is the driver of a
vehicle, demand the person's driver's license... " Id. § 46-5-401(2)(a).
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address. 33 The consequences of non-compliance vary by state but can be as
severe as jail time 34 or as minimal as a fine.35
A. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment states,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable search and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by [olath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. 36
Current "stop and identify" laws find constitutional footing in Terry v.
Ohio.37 In Terry, a police officer on patrol observed two men taking turns
walking past a store window.38 The men each walked past the window
nearly a dozen times, briefly conferring with each other after each trip.39
The officer followed the men on the belief that they were planning a
robbery.40 The officer walked up to the men and asked them to provide
their names.4 1 When their responses were unintelligible, the officer patted
down one of the men and located a pistol in the overcoat. 42 After a search
of the other man, the officer located another pistol and charged both men
with carrying a concealed weapon.4 3
The Terry Court upheld the conviction on the grounds that the search
and seizure of the pistols was protective, and the officer had reasonable
grounds to believe the men were carrying weapons.4 The Court allowed
33. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103 (2004). The statute provides, "A peace officer may stop
any person who he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a
crime and may require him to give his name and address .. " Id. at § 16-3-103(1).
34. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.021 (West 2003). The statute provides, "Any person violating
the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as
provided in [§] 775.082 . I..." Id  § 856.021(3). The sentencing guideline provides "a
misdemeanor of the second degree, by a definite term of imprisonment not exceeding 60 days."
Id. § 775.082(4)(b) (West 2003).
35. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1983 (2004). The statute provides, "A person who refuses to
identify himself or herself to the court on request shall immediately and without service of an
order on the person be subject to civil contempt proceedings ...." Id. § 1983(b).
36. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
37. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
38. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 6-7.
42. Id. at 7.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 27.
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the detention of an individual for further investigation out of concern for
police efficacy, but required the detention to arise out of a reasonable
suspicion of involvement in criminal activity.4 5
The Supreme Court defined what behavior that could form the basis for
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce,46 by listing behaviors or situations that do not qualify as a basis for
reasonably suspicious activity. 47 In Brignoni-Ponce, Border Patrol officers
stopped a car because the occupants appeared to be of Mexican heritage.48
Upon questioning, the officers discerned that two of the occupants were
illegal aliens; the driver was charged with transporting illegal aliens. 49 The
Court affirmed the lower court's decision to suppress the evidence
regarding the illegal aliens because the information was gained from an
illegal seizure. 50 The Court held that the Border Patrol has the power to
detain people without a warrant in situations where the officer has reason-
able grounds to believe the persons in question are illegal immigrants.5 '
However, the Court determined that merely being of Mexican descent was
not a basis for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; therefore, the
inquiry into the passenger's citizenship status was in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.52
Avoiding unjustified detentions was a key concern of the Supreme
Court's invalidation of a Texas statute in 1979.53 In Brown v. Texas,54
police officers stopped an unknown man when they Observed him leaving
an alley in a high crime area in the opposite direction of another man.55
The Court held that Texas's "stop and identify" statute was in violation of
the Fourth Amendment as applied to Mr. Brown since there was no basis
for reasonably suspecting Mr. Brown of criminal activity at the time of his
45. Id. at 22; see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227 (1985) (stating that
because criminal activity is not limited to current or ongoing conduct, past criminal activity can be
used as a basis for detention under reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).
46. 422 U.S. 873 (1975)
47. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883.
48. Id. at 875.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 875-76.
51. Id. at 877.
52. Id. at 886.
53. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-53 (1979); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(a)
(Vernon 1974) (stating "[al person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to give his name,
residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and
requested the information").
54. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
55. Brown, 443 U.S. at 48-49.
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arrest. 56 The State argued the stop was valid because there were reasonable
grounds to believe that the appellant was involved in criminal activity. 57
The Court found this claim unpersuasive, pointing to the lack of "any facts
supporting that conclusion." 58 The Court held that when "a stop is not
based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices
exceeds tolerable limits." 59 Later Supreme Courts have used the need for a
factual basis in the creation of reasonable suspicion.60
Just as there must be a standard for stopping an individual, there must
be a standard for actions an individual must take to be in compliance with a
request for identification.6 1 In Kolender v. Lawson,62 a California statute
provided that a person stopped on reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct
must provide "credible and reliable" identification; however, the statute
failed to articulate what form of proof met that requirement. 63 The Court
held that the lack of a standard "for determining what a suspect has to do in
order to satisfy the requirement" rendered the law void for vagueness. 64
The Kolender Court again expressed concern that the enforcement of the
law not be on an arbitrary basis. 65
Having established the requirements for the production of identifica-
tion,66 as well as the need for standards of compliance, 67 the Court
addressed the parameters of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment in
INS v. Delgado.68 In Delgado, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
56. Id. at 53; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(b) (stating a person commits an
offense if he intentionally refuses to report or gives a false report of his name and residence ad-
dress to a peace officer who has lawfully stopped him and requested the information).
57. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.
58. Id. at 52.
59. Id.; see Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (holding the city's
vagrancy statute unconstitutional because the ordinance did not provide fair notice of prohibited
conduct). In Papachristou, the Court determined that the Jacksonville ordinance "encourage[d]
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Id.
60. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985). In Hayes, the Court held that the presence
of "articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a criminal of-
fense" creates a situation where the police may briefly detain and question a person to ascertain
their identity. Id.
61. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353-54 (1983); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e)
(West 1970) (stating that a person "who refuses to identify himself and to account for his presence
when requested by any peace officer[,] ... if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate
to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification[,]" is guilty of a
misdemeanor).
62. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
63. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 353-54.
64. Id. at 358.
65. Id.
66. Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
67. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361.
68. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
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(INS) executed two warrants at a factory believed to employ illegal
immigrants.69 INS officials walked around the premises, questioned the
workers within the factory as to their citizenship, but at no time detained or
prevented workers from leaving.70 The Court ruled that a request for
identification, by itself, does not violate the Fourth Amendment except
where "the encounter [was] so intimidating ... that a reasonable person
would have believed he was not free to leave." 7 1 The majority held that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply in situations of consensual contact
between police and citizens. 72 Fourth Amendment protections are activated
when a citizen no longer wishes to respond to questioning and the police
employ additional methods, such as detention, to obtain information. 73
Delgado defined the threshold inquiry for the protections of the Fourth
Amendment to be available to individuals. 74 However, neither Delgado nor
its predecessor cases provided a means of determining when it is reasonable
to stop citizens and question them as to their identity.75
1. Defining Reasonable
Initially, when addressing cases involving stop and identify laws, the
Supreme Court limited its determination of reasonableness to the particular
facts of the case.76 In Brown v. Texas, the Court addressed the reason-
ableness of a Texas statute that permitted the detention of a person who had
been lawfully stopped but who refused to provide identification. 77 The
Supreme Court held that Mr. Brown's interest in personal security and
privacy outweighed the public interest of crime prevention, so his detention
was not reasonable in the applicable situation.78 However, the Court did
69. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 212.
70. Id. at 212-13.
71. Id. at 216.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 216-17.
74. See id. at 216 (discussing Brown, Terry, and other cases, but not providing an exact
definition of reasonable).
75. Id.; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1979) (stating that a stop and
detention requires a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because the police cannot stop
drivers at random to check for violations).
76. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (stating that a seizure must be based on
specific, objective facts).
77. Id. at 49; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN § 38.02(a) (1974) (stating that refusing to
provide identification or providing false identification to an officer while lawfully detained is an
offense).
78. Brown, 443 U.S. at 52-53.
2005]
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not set forth a general test for determining reasonableness beyond the facts
of the case. 79
It was not until Delaware v. Prouse80 that a test for reasonableness was
defined.81 In Prouse, a Delaware patrolman stopped a vehicle to verify that
the driver was licensed and had proper registration.82 Upon stopping the
vehicle, the officer discovered the driver was in possession of marijuana
and arrested him. 83 The State argued that its interest in highway safety
outweighed any Fourth Amendment considerations. 84 However, the Court
ruled that the State's interest was not sufficient to justify the intrusion upon
Prouse's privacy and security interests.8 5 In determining the reasonableness
of a seizure, the Court set forth a balancing test: weigh the legitimate
government interest against the intrusion on the individual's rights under
the Fourth Amendment. 86
The Supreme Court considers the time the criminal activity occurred as
one factor in the balancing test between personal rights and law enforce-
ment interests.87 In balancing the legitimate government interest against the
intrusion on the individual's rights, past criminal conduct affects the weight
the Court will give to each interest. 88 This is not to say that past criminal
activity acts as a barrier in applying the balancing test in terms of reason-
ableness, but the governmental interest in public safety is lessened in such
cases. 89 However, there can remain a strong interest in "solving crimes and
bringing [sic] offenders to justice" depending on the circumstances. 90
Whether or not a seizure is reasonable will depend in part on when the
criminal activity occurred. 91
79. Id. at 47-53.
80. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
81. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.
82. Id. at 650.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 655.
85. Id. at 657.
86. Id. at 654.
87. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 229. The Court stated that government's interest remains strong "where police
have been unable to locate a person suspected of involvement in a past crime. . . [plarticularly in
the context of felonies or crimes involving a threat to public safety, it is in the public interest that
the crime be solved and the suspect detained as promptly as possible." Id.
91. Id. at 228.
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2. Scope of Detention
The Court has found requesting the identity of an individual during a
Terry stop to be standard police practice. 92 The ability to question an indi-
vidual's identity is an essential tool used to exercise the law enforcement
interest of the government. 93
Even when the request for identification is valid, there are limits on the
scope of the seizure.94 In Adams v. Williams,95 an officer received informa-
tion from a known informant that Williams was in the possession of drugs
and a firearm. 96 Pursuant to this information, the officer approached
William's vehicle and seized the firearm relying on the rule in Terry, which
permits an officer to conduct a limited search to ensure the officer's safety
in the course of an investigation.97 A significant amount of drugs and a
second firearm were found during the additional search. 98 The Court held
that the level of information required was different to stop an individual for
the purpose of ascertaining their identity than to arrest an individual.99 The
evidence was held permissible because probable cause is evaluated under
"the circumstances at the time of the arrest."100 The majority ruled that an
officer's knowledge need not be based upon personal observation at the
time the individual is stopped.lOl Therefore, reasonable suspicion can be
formed through information gathered from reliable sources. 102 Since the
gun was where the informant alleged, the Court ruled that a further search
of the vehicle for the purported drugs was justified because the officer's
suspicion of criminal activity was based on the informant's statements. 103
92. See id. at 229 (stating that "the ability [of the police] to stop ... [a suspect], ask
questions, or check identification in the absence of probable cause promotes strong government
interest in solving crimes").
93. Id.
94. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
95. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
96. Adams, 407 U.S. at 144-45.
97. Id. at 145-46. The Hiibel Court stated the Terry rule as, "law enforcement officer's
reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop
the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further."
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Ct. of Nevada, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458 (2004).
98. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 145-46 (holding that an officer lacking probable cause for an
arrest can still detain an individual to ascertain their identity in an attempt to gather enough
information to conclude the person is more likely than not involved in criminal conduct).
99. Id. at 145.
100. Id. at 149.
101. Id. at 147.
102. Id.
103. Id. The fact that the officer knew and had worked with the informant in the past was
considered to be important in determining the reasonableness of the officer's reliance. Id. at 146.
The possible criminal liability of the informant for providing false information was viewed by the
Court as significantly increasing the reliability of the information. Id. at 146-47.
2005]
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The formation of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on outside
sources is important because it allows the police to respond rapidly to
threats posed by criminal activity. 104 The ability to take immediate action
aids the police in preventing and solving crimes since evidence can be
disposed of in the time it takes the police to gather enough firsthand
knowledge to justify detaining an individual. 105
As seen in the Adams decision, the Court does not require the same
level of proof for conviction as it does for an arrest.106 As a result of
applying a lowered standard of the proof required to detain an individual,
the Court has also held that the detention cannot be similar to a traditional
arrest. 107 Thus, statements made during an investigatory stop that resem-
bles a traditional arrest are not admissible. 108
In Dunaway v. New York, 10 9 the Court held there must be an
intervening event breaking the connection between an illegal detention and
a statement for the evidence to be admissible. 110 In Dunaway, the police
received information about a possible suspect in a homicide from a jailed
informant."' The defendant was placed in custody based on the infor-
mant's allegation.l' 2 Even though the police did not believe they could
attain a warrant based on the information, they detained the suspect. 1' 3
After being driven to the police station, the defendant was placed in an
interrogation room and questioned after being read his Miranda rights. 114
During questioning, the man made incriminating statements that implicated
104. Id. at 148.
105. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228-29.
106. Adams, 407 U.S. at 149. In order to detain an individual, the police need to have
probable cause to believe that criminal activity may be occurring. Id. at 148. The formation of a
reasonable suspicion allows the police to detain an individual to take further investigatory
measures to determine whether a crime has or will occur. Id. at 149. In order to make an arrest,
the police need probable cause formed by facts that indicate a crime has or is being committed.
Id.
107. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1979) (holding the statements made
while in custody to be inadmissible because they resulted from an improper detention).
108. Id. at 219.
109. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
110. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 219.
111. Id. at 202-03.
112. Id. The informant, an inmate awaiting burglary charges, alleged that the defendant was
involved in a murder and attempted robbery. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The Miranda rule prohibits the use
of statements made during a custodial interrogation in a criminal prosecution unless they have
been warned "that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney." Id. The Court
defined a custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom .... " Id.
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him in the murder."15 The case appeared before the Supreme Court to
determine the issue of probable cause. 116 The lack of probable cause led the
Court to reject the State's assertion that a balancing test, such as the one in
Brignoni-Ponce, should apply.ll 7 The Court held that a balancing test was
only applicable in situations where, unlike an arrest, there was minimal
intrusion of an individual's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.118 As a result, if a detention is "indistinguishable
from a traditional arrest," the Fourth Amendment requires that the detention
result from probable cause.1 19
An important factor in determining what constitutes a traditional arrest
is the length of the detention.120 The duration of the stop is considered part
of the requirement that the detention not resemble a traditional arrest. 121
The length of the detention must only be as long as is necessary to achieve
the law enforcement objective. 122 In United States v. Place,123 drug en-
forcement officers suspected a passenger of carrying narcotics and seized
his bags until a warrant could be issued.' 24 The warrant was issued three
days later and the search of the bags resulted in the discovery of a sub-
stantial quantity of cocaine.125 The Court ruled that there was no difference
in the level of intrusion in the detention of property as compared to personal
detention.126 The police knew the time and destination of the suspect's
flight, but failed to take the necessary preparatory steps so the investigation
could be completed when he arrived.' 27 The Court held that the police must
115. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 203. In overturning the trial court's denial of the defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment required
that a "causal connection between the statements and the illegal arrest [be] broken sufficiently."
Id. at 204. The matter was remanded to consider the case given a supervening Supreme Court
ruling. Id.
116. Id. at 206.
117. Id. at 212; see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883-84 (1975)
(holding that reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment intrusion is determined by balancing an
individual's right to personal security against the public interest).
118. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212.
119. Id. at 212-13.
120. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 709-10.
123. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
124. Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 705. See cf. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (holding that the
reasonableness of the length of personal detention was determined by examining the manner in
which the investigating officer sought to confirm or dismiss his suspicions of criminal activity).
127. Place, 462 U.S. at 709.
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minimize the length of detention when possible so as to lessen the intrusion
on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights.128
The Court has suggested that Miranda rights do not apply in a custodial
stop.129 In Berkemer v. McCarty,130 a car that was weaving back and forth
on an interstate was pulled over by the state highway patrol.'31 The driver
failed a field sobriety test and was taken into custody.132 Incriminating
statements regarding the consumption of alcohol and marijuana were made
by the driver before and after his arrest, but at no time was he read his
Miranda rights. 133
In finding the post-arrest statements inadmissible, the Court held that
Miranda rights apply to persons undergoing custodial interrogation regard-
less of the gravity of the offense. 134 However, the pre-arrest statements
were held to be admissible because a traffic stop does not create pressures
on the detained individual that "sufficiently impair his free exercise of his
privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his
constitutional rights."135 The Court noted that the assumed brief and tem-
porary nature of a traffic stop combined with the typical circumstances
surrounding such a stop lessen the dangers of an individual being coerced
into making self-incriminating statements. 136 The Court compared the non-
coercive nature of routine traffic stops to factors inherent in Terry stops and
concluded that the absence of a recitation of Miranda rights requirement in
cases regarding Terry stops was due to the non-custodial nature of such
detentions. 137
3. Consequences of Non-Compliance
The extent to which a state can punish an individual for failing to
identify themselves is unclear.138 Prior to Hiibel, the Court had not had the
opportunity to decide whether an individual who does not comply with a
request for identification during the course of a valid investigatory stop may
128. Id.
129. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (holding that statements made
during a traffic stop are admissible because of the non-coercive nature of such detentions).
130. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
131. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 423.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 423-24.
134. Id. at 434, 442.
135. Id. at 437.
136. Id. at 437-38.
137. Id. at 440; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467
(1966).
138. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
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be punished.139 However, the Court has noted that the ability of a detainee
to gain their release from custodial detention by not responding to inquiries,
such as to identity, was part of the justification for not requiring the
recitation of Miranda rights.140
B. THE PROTECTIONS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Fifth Amendment provides that no one "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."141 The Court has held that
an individual can assert the Fifth Amendment privilege when: (1) com-
munications are testimonial in nature; (2) the substance of the communi-
cation was incriminating; and (3) the production of the communication was
compelled. 4 2 The Court has defined testimonial communications as acts or
statements of the accused that convey information used in the prosecution
of criminal charges. 143
In United States v. Hubbell,144 the Court held the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination covers compelled testimony that may
lead to incriminating sources of information.145 In Hubbell, the prosecutor
obtained an order requiring the defendant to produce certain financial
documents, but the defendant claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.146 In response, the prosecution obtained a
subpoena for the documents and the defendant produced the papers he
claimed were under the Fifth Amendment privilege.147 The Court affirmed
the dismissal of the indictment stemming from the information contained
within the documents on the basis that there was a compelled testimonial
aspect in responding to a subpoena.14 8 Since the prosecution had no
knowledge of the criminal activities revealed by the documents prior to
their examination, the Court held that the privilege against self-
139. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 n. 3 (1979).
140. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
142. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-38 (2000) (holding that Hubbell could
claim the Fifth Amendment privilege because the compelled statements were testimonial in nature
and the information contained within the statements formed the basis for the criminal charges).
143. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988) (holding the compelled disclosure
of bank accounts was not a testimonial statement because the disclosure was not being used to
prove the factual existence of the bank accounts).
144. 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
145. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43.
146. Id. at 31.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 36; see also Doe, 487 U.S. at 209 (stating "[p]roducing documents in compliance
with a subpoena ... admit[s] that the papers existed ... and were authentic").
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incrimination could be invoked because of the derivative use of the
information obtained. 149
In addition to situations where testimony is compelled, the Court has
held the Fifth Amendment privilege can be invoked where evidence is
incriminating.150 However, communications that cause embarrassment or
discomfort but hold no incriminating evidence are not covered by the Fifth
Amendment.151 In Brown v. Walker,152 an employee of a railroad company
claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination while
testifying about possible violations of the Interstate Commerce Act of
1893.153 The Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege could not be
invoked because the Interstate Commerce Act provided immunity to those
who were compelled to testify.154 A witness must reasonably believe there
is a real and appreciable danger stemming from his testimony in order to
invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.155
Therefore, reasonableness in claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege is
examined in terms of the nature of the witnesses' belief that criminal
prosecution or evidence that might be used against them will result from
their testimony. 156
In Kastigar v. United States,157 the government granted immunity to
witnesses in order to compel their testimony under subpoena. 158 The Court
found that the grant of immunity was equal to the protection against self-
incrimination provided by the Fifth Amendment.159 The Court has held
testimonial statements that may "furnish a link in the chain of evidence
needed to prosecute" provide the basis for the reasonable grounds necessary
to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.160
149. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 41-42.
150. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 428 (1984).
151. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896).
152. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
153. Brown, 161 U.S. at 593.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 599-60 (citing Queen v. Boyes, I Best & S. 311, 321 (1861) (Cockburn, C. J.)).
156. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972).
157. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
158. Id. at 442.
159. Id. at 453.
160. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (holding the Fifth Amendment
privilege was available to the defendant because it was reasonable to fear criminal prosecution if
he responded to questioning). See cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02 (1990)
(holding that questions regarding a person's name and address were ordinary police procedure
exempt from the requirements of Miranda). In Muniz, the Court noted there are questions, such as
the identity of a person, which may be asked without Miranda warnings if "reasonably related to
the police's administrative concerns." Id. The Court held that questions that are intended to illicit
a response outside the custodial concerns of police procedure are considered to be part of a
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When there is no danger of prosecution, such as in Kastigar, it is not
reasonable for a person to believe their testimonial statements can be used
against them in a criminal prosecution.161
In evaluating the basis for fearing criminal liability, the Court has
suggested the production of certain information may be insufficiently
incriminating to allow the invocation of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 162  In Baltimore City Department of Social Services v.
Bouknight,163 an allegedly abusive mother argued that surrendering her
child to protective care in compliance with a court order would be an act of
self-incrimination because "the act of production would amount to testi-
mony regarding her control over, and possession of, [her child]."164 The
Court decided the case on other grounds, but left open the possibility that
there may be situations where a person would not qualify for the Fifth
Amendment privilege because the government could readily establish evi-
dence by other means and thereby render the information insufficiently
incriminating.165
C. SUMMARY OF LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has held the detention must be based on a reason-
able belief of criminal activity166 formed from specific facts to avoid
arbitrary police decisions in order for the detention of an individual to
comply with the Fourth Amendment requirements.167 To avoid arbitrary
arrests, the Court requires fair notice of the standard of compliance to re-
quests for identification. 168 The reasonableness of the detention is deter-
mined by balancing a legitimate government interest against the Fourth
custodial interrogation and subject to the requirements of Miranda if the answers to such
questions are to be admitted as evidence in criminal proceedings. Id.
161. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462.
162. See Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1990)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege could not be claimed because defendant voluntarily
assumed custody of a child in whom the state has an interest). See cf California v. Beyers, 402
U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (requiring drivers who are involved in an accident to stop and identify
themselves violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). In Beyers, the
Court held a person's identity "does not by itself implicate anyone in criminal conduct." Id. The
Court acknowledged that stopping and providing one's identity may allow prosecution but the
criminal charges would result from other factors and evidence not dependent on identity. Id. The
Court distinguished between ascertaining an individual's identity and obtaining the facts necessary
for the filing of criminal charges. Id.
163. 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
164. Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555.
165. Id.
166. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
167. Brown v, Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
168. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353-54 (1983).
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Amendment rights of the individual.169 However, a detention must not
resemble a traditional arrest. 170 The circumstances surrounding questioning
and the length of the detention are among the factors examined in whether a
detention resembles a traditional arrest.171 In terms of the Fifth Amend-
ment, there must be a reasonable belief that a response to a request for
identification will result in criminal prosecution in order to claim the
privilege against self-incrimination. 172
III. ANALYSIS
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District
Court,173 which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas.174 Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg joined.1 75 Justice
Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion. 176
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The first issue before the Supreme Court in Hiibel was whether
requiring an individual to identify themselves under a "stop and identify"
statute violated the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 177 The Court held there was no violation of the
Fourth Amendment if a person stopped under reasonable suspicion of crim-
inal activity was detained only long enough to ascertain their identity.178
The second issue before the Hiibel Court was whether compelling a
person to identify themselves under a "stop and identify" law violated the
Fifth Amendment's prohibition against self-incrimination.179 The Court
held there was no Fifth Amendment violation because it was not reasonable
to believe the production of a name would result in criminal liability where
an individual has not committed any criminal offense.180  The Court
169. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
170. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1979).
171. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 (1984).
172. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,445 (1972).
173. 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
174. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2454.
175. Id. at 2461.
176. Id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 2457.
178. Id. at 2459.
179. Id. at 2460.
180. Id. at 2461.
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declined to decide the constitutionality of compelling identification in a
situation where identity provides a link to a separate offense. 181
1. Application of the Balancing Test to Nevada's "Stop and
Identify" Statute
The Court defined reasonableness by balancing Mr. Hiibel's individual
interests against the government's interest in effective law enforcement and
found the law to be in compliance with the Fourth Amendment's protec-
tions against unreasonable searches and seizures. 182 In determining the
extent of the governmental interest involved, the Court noted that the ability
of the police to identify a suspect was a crucial part of investigating
crimes. 83 The Court found that knowing the identity of a detainee allowed
the government to check for outstanding warrants and a record of
violence.184 The Court further determined that ascertaining an individual's
identity may also help clear them of a particular crime, allowing police to
focus limited resources in other areas. 185 The Court noted that police often
face volatile situations with incomplete facts where identification of the
parties involved can aid in threat assessment. 186 As a result, the Court held
that the ability to ascertain an individual's identity was an important
governmental interest. 187
Another factor the Court considered important under Nevada's "stop
and identify" statute was that the request for identification did not alter the
length of the detention or its location.188 The Court found the detention of
Mr. Hiibel to be in compliance with the Fourth Amendment limits, noting
that the inquiry never went beyond Mr. Hiibel's identity, nor did it extended
beyond the time necessary to ascertain his name. 189 The Court found the
intrusion upon the individual was minimal because the scope of the
questioning was limited to the person's identity and the detention only
lasted long enough to accomplish identification.190 As such, the Court held
that the identification request under the Nevada law "has an immediate
relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop."191
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2459.
183. Id. at 2458.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2459.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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Additionally, the Court stated that the threat of punishment was necessary
for the request for identification to be effective. 192
Hiibel argued that the Court had previously determined that the Fourth
Amendment does not compel a person to respond to a request for identifi-
cation. 193 The Court distinguished between the present case and previous
concurrences and dicta cited by Hiibel concerning the inability to compel a
person to respond to questioning during a Terry stop because those cases
defined an individual's rights under the Fourth Amendment.194 The Court
held previous concurrences and dicta were not controlling in this case,
noting that the requirement to provide identification in this case derived
from Nevada law, not the United States Constitution.19 5
2. Nevada's "Stop and Identify" Statute was in Compliance with
Terry Stop Standards
The Court held that a request for identification during an investigatory
detention must be reasonably related to the justification for the stop. 9 6 Mr.
Hiibel argued that the Nevada law allowed arbitrary arrests and abuses by
police officers. 97 The Court disagreed, noting that the law requires the
request for identification to arise out of the purpose for the initial detention
of the individual. 9 8 The Court determined that the request for identifi-
cation flowed from the investigation of the assault report, not from an
attempt by the police to make an arrest for failure to provide identifica-
tion.199 Therefore, the Court found the request for identification was a
"common sense inquiry" in the course of a valid Terry stop. 200
3. The Availability of the Fifth Amendment Privilege did not Rely
on Whether Statements were Testimonial
The Court did not decide whether Mr. Hiibel's statements were outside
the limits of the Fifth Amendment privilege, despite the assertion by
respondent that the Nevada law requires only non-testimonial statements. 201
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2458-59.
194. Id. at 2459.
195. Id.
196. Id.; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (stating an investigatory detention
must be "justified at its inception, and... reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place").
197. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
198. Id. at 2459-60.
199. Id. at 2460.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2460-61.
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The Court previously defined testimonial statements as communications
that "explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose infor-
mation." 202 The Court did not determine whether the compelled production
of an individual's name was a testimonial statement.203 Instead, the Court
held the lack of reasonable grounds to fear criminal liability prevented an
inquiry into the nature of the statements mandated by the Nevada law. 204
4. No Reasonable Grounds to Fear Prosecution
In addition to the Fourth Amendment challenges, Mr. Hiibel argued the
Nevada law violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against self-
incrimination. 205 The Court noted that the Fifth Amendment does not
provide an absolute right to remain silent when faced with questioning from
the government. 206 In order to qualify for the privilege, the Court reasoned
that testimony, even if compelled, must be incriminating.207 The Court did
not view the knowledge of an individual's name as likely to be incrimi-
nating. 208 The Court stated that Mr. Hiibel lacked reasonable grounds to
fear prosecution because he failed to articulate how providing his name
would have resulted in criminal liability.209 The Court held that the lack of
possible criminal prosecution eliminated any claim to the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 210
5. Narrow Scope of Law
After Terry, the Court required that investigatory detentions not
resemble a traditional arrest in scope or duration.211 The Nevada law, as
interpreted by the Court, was in compliance with these requirements be-
cause the inquires are confined to the name of the individual and the deten-
tion itself can only last as long as necessary to determine the person's
identity.2 12 In finding no Fifth Amendment violation, the Court emphasized
the fact that Nevada's "stop and identify" statute only required an individ-
ual to state their name. 213 As a result, the Court did not decide the issue of
202. Id. at 2460 (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988)).
203. Id. at 2460-61.
204. Id. at 2461.
205. Id. at 2460.
206. Id. at 2460-61.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2461.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., id. at 2458 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979)).
212. ld. at 2459-60.
213. Id. at 2457, 2461.
2005]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
whether a statute that required the production of a driver's license or other
form of identification would be in contravention of the Fifth Amendment. 214
However, the Court noted that even a witness called to the stand who
claims the Fifth Amendment privilege must acknowledge their identity.215
The Court reasoned that in order to violate the Fifth Amendment, self-
identification needed to provide evidence connecting the person to a
separate offense.216
6. Summary of Majority Opinion
The Court determined that the government's interest in effective law
enforcement contained within Nevada's "stop and identify" statute out-
weighed the Fourth Amendment concerns. 217 The request for identification
was constitutional because it was reasonably related to the justification for
the initial detention. 218 The Court did not base the unavailability of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on whether providing
identification was a testimonial statement. 219 Additionally, the Court held
that Nevada's "stop and identify" statute was not in violation of the Fourth
Amendment because detentions under the statute did not resemble tradi-
tional arrests.220 The Court found that requiring a person to comply with
the identification request by stating their name was not in contravention of
the Fifth Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination.22'
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court's holding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege was unavailable to Mr. Hiibel since he believed the
Nevada law impermissibly singles out a narrow class of people. 222 He
stated that the Nevada law focused on individuals under criminal investi-
gation, a group Justice Stevens believed to be the intended beneficiary of
the Fifth Amendment privilege. 223
214. Id. at 2461.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2459.
218. Id. at 2459-60.
219. Id. at 2460-61.
220. Id. at 2458 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979)).
221. Id. at 2461.
222. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)). Justice Stevens stated "[tihe statute ... is directed not at the public at
large, but rather at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities." Id.
223. Id. at 2462.
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Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's holding that the police have
the ability to ask individuals questions during the course of a valid Terry
stop.22 4 However, he stated that detained persons should have broad rights
to refuse to answer any questions asked by the authorities. 225
Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's determination that the
communication required under the Nevada law was not testimonial in na-
ture.226 Instead, Justice Stevens recommended a broader definition to what
can be considered incriminating.2 27 He would have included communi-
cations that "lead to the discovery of incriminating evidence even though
the statements themselves are not incriminating." 228 Justice Stevens stated
that an officer should only ask for a person's identification if the officer
believed such information may "furnish a link in a chain of evidence needed
to prosecute [the individual]." 2 29 Therefore, he believed that compelling an
individual to identify themselves is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. 230
C. JUSTICE BREYER'S DISSENT
Justice Breyer argued that the Nevada law went beyond the limits of
Terry because it compelled answers to police inquiries. 231 Justice Breyer
agreed with the majority that there was a governmental interest in pre-
venting crime, but found no legitimate governmental interest in compelling
a person to identify themselves. 232
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer reasoned that the Fifth Amend-
ment's protection against self-incrimination granted Mr. Hiibel the right to
refuse to identify himself in the course of a valid Terry stop.2 33 Justice
Breyer asserted that the legal system has come to rely on two decades of
concurring opinions as the basis of the right of an individual to refuse to
respond to questioning in the course of a valid Terry stop. 234 Given this
tradition of reliance, Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority's decision
because it would cause confusion in both law enforcement and legislative
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2463-64.
227. Id.
228. Id. (citing United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 37 (2000)).
229. Id. (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2464 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 2465-66.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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enactment as to the extent a person may be compelled to respond to
questioning during a valid Terry stop.235
IV. IMPACT
A. ENFORCEMENT
In preparation for the 2004 Republican National Convention, potential
protestors received differing advice on whether to provide identification to
questioning police officers. 236 The New York City chapter of the National
Lawyers Guild advised would-be protestors not to respond to officers when
approached. 237 The National Lawyers Guild suggested protestors walk
away from the police and only provide identification if arrested. 238 A
spokesperson for the New York Police Department said that an officer
would only ask for identification if there was reasonable suspicion of a
crime, the same policy the department followed prior to the Hiibel
decision. 239 Thus, the initial effect of Hiibel on law enforcement appeared
to have been an increased awareness of the choices individuals face when
the police ask for identification.
B. LEGISLATION
The Hiibel decision could play a role in determining the constitu-
tionality of a national identity card.240 Important to this debate is whether
the Court will uphold a law that requires the physical production of a
driver's license. 241 A key element to the Hiibel Court was that the Nevada
law specified that a verbal statement of an individual's name satisfied the
identification requirement. 242 Whether the Court would extend the govern-
ment's ability to ascertain a person's identity through physical documents is
a major factor in the creation of a national identity card.243
Presumably, a national identity card would be linked to a national
database containing outstanding warrants and criminal records. 244 This
235. Id.
236. Mike Mclntire, Preparing for the Convention: The Law, N.Y. TIMES Aug. 26, 2004, at 1.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 56
FLA. L. REV. 697, 717 (2004).
241. Id. at 718.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 718.
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creates another issue of whether requiring the production of an identity card
and the subsequent background check significantly alters the nature of the
stop enough so that it is deemed to resemble a traditional arrest. 245 The
length of time necessary to check a person's identity against the database
may sufficiently prolong the detention enough to remove the stop from
permissible limits under the Fourth Amendment's protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. 246
C. NORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota has a similar statute to Nevada's, but is broader in terms
of the production requirement.247 Nevada's "stop and identify" statute
requires only that the name of the individual be provided.248 However,
North Dakota's statute also requires the name, address, and an explanation
of what the person is doing.249 Previously, the Kolender Court found a law
unconstitutional because it failed to provide the public with notice of how
they are to comply with the request for identification. 250 The narrow scope
of the obligation of a detainee under the Nevada statute was a key reason
the Court held that the law was in accordance with the Fourth Amend-
ment. 251 The North Dakota statute does not specify how an individual may
satisfy the request for identification, such as showing a driver's license or
simply stating their name. 252 The impact of Hiibel on North Dakota is
unclear since any challenge to North Dakota's "stop and identify" statute
would appear to rely on the Court's holding in Kolender because the statute
lacks notice of how individuals comply with a request for identification. 253
In State v. Mathre,254 the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the
issue of resisting arrest.255 The court did not utilize Hiibel in deciding the
case but discussed a previous decision where the court determined a man
245. See e.g., id. at 718-19 (explaining that possible delays or computer glitches in searching
a database for someone's identity could alter the nature of an investigatory stop).
246. Id. at 719.
247. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (2003), with NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3)
(2004).
248. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3).
249. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21.
250. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353-54 (1983) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §
647(e) (West 1970)).
251. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2457 (2004).
252. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21.
253. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (2003) with Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
361-62 (1983).
254. 683 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 2004).
255. Mathre, 683 N.W.2d at 921.
2005]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
was wrongfully detained by police. 256 The court appeared to signal its
intention to use Hiibel as authority in upholding convictions for refusing to
provide identification during a lawful investigatory stop.257
D. ADJUDICATION
In cases outside North Dakota, the Hiibel decision has had varying
impacts. In United States v. Jackson,258 a man was arrested after failing to
provide a driver's license upon being stopped for a traffic offense.259 The
court held that the request for identification was reasonable since Hiibel
established that an officer may require a detainee to provide identification
during an investigatory stop.2 60 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.261
Conversely, Hiibel has been utilized by dissenting judges to argue
against compelled identification. 262 In United States v. Kincade,263 the
court faced the issue of whether DNA profiling of conditionally released
prisoners without individualized suspicion of continued criminal conduct
was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 264 The majority determined
that there was no violation because the government's interest in effective
crime prevention outweighed the privacy concerns involved. 265 However,
the dissent argued that Hiibel stood for the proposition that individualized
suspicion must be present for a search and seizure to be reasonable.2 66 The
long-term impact of Hiibel will ultimately depend on how the Supreme
Court rules on the interpretation of Hiibel by lower courts.
256. Id. at 924; see also State v. Ritter, 472 N.W.2d 444, 448-49 (N.D. 1991) (holding that
officers may ask questions of detainees but they are not allowed to compel a response to a request
for identification)).
257. Id. The court noted that Hiibel held that Nevada's stop and identify law did not violate
either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. Id.
258. 377 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2004).
259. Jackson, 377 F.3d at 716.
260. Id. at 717; see also Martiszus v. Wash. County, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1168 n.2 (2004)
(stating in dicta that Hiibel alters Ninth Circuit precedent that does not allow an officer to compel
an individual to provide identification even in cases where there is reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity).
261. Jackson v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 649 (2004).
262. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 865 (9th Cir. 2004).
263. 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir, 2004).
264. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 816.
265. Id. at 839-40.
266. Id. at 853-54 n. 10 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Hiibel, the Supreme Court ruled that Nevada's "stop and identify"
statute was constitutional.267 The Court held that the law was narrowly
drafted to avoid unreasonable searches and seizures as prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment. 268 Further, the Court found that the Fifth Amendment
privilege could not be invoked by Mr. Hiibel since he lacked reasonable
grounds to believe the production of his name could lead to criminal
liability. 269
Matthew Schmidt
267. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Ct. of Nevada, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2461 (2004).
268. Id. at 2459.
269. Id. at 2461.
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